This paper investigates the effect of nominal interest rates on the use and maturity structure of corporate debt. Since interest payments are tax deductible, when borrowers face a higher tax rate than lenders, tax-arbitrage gains from corporate debt become larger as nominal interest rates increase. For similar reasons, firms should shift towards more long-term debt as long-term rates rise relative to short-term rates. Our paper presents evidence consistent with both forecasts, using corporate and personal tax return data from the U.S. Statistics of Income.
Introduction
There has been a substantial literature documenting the effects of the tax structure on corporate use of debt vs. equity finance. According to this literature, debt finance is encouraged to the degree that the corporate tax rate is higher than the relevant personal tax rate on interest income: more taxes are saved on corporate interest deductions than are owed on the resulting interest income.
Since the size of these tax savings per dollar of corporate debt is proportional to nominal interest rates, the tax incentive to favor debt finance increases with nominal interest rates as well as with the difference between corporate and personal tax rates. For similar reasons, the term structure of interest rates can affect a firm's choice of the maturity of its debt structure. This point is developed formally in Gordon (1982) and Brick and Ravid (1985) . 1 In particular, to the degree that the long-term interest rate is higher than the short-term rate, the tax savings from use of long-term debt increase relative to the tax savings from an equivalent amount of short-term debt. These incentives are stronger the larger the tax differential.
There is very little empirical evidence to date, however, supporting such forecasted effects of interest rates and the term structure on corporate financial policy. The objective of this paper is to provide such tests. It is the first paper to our knowledge to provide clear support for these forecasts from the theory. For example, Gordon (1982) tested these forecasts using aggregate time-series data for the U.S. While the point estimates were consistent with the theory, 2 standard errors were high based on twenty-five observations. No attempt was made in 1 Brick and Ravid (1991) extended the analysis to handle stochastic interest rates. Boyce and Kalotay (1979) noted a related incentive to make bonds callable when corporate tax rates are relatively high. 2 In particular, the paper finds that use of long-term debt falls when the short-term interest rate goes up, conditional on the longterm interest rate, while use of short-term debt is unaffected, raising the ratio of short-term to long-term debt. Conversely, when the long-term interest rate increases, long-term debt increases much more than short-term debt.
that paper to test the effects of changes in relative tax rates -there had been too little variation during the time period used.
There have also been a few attempts to test the effects of the term structure of interest rates on the maturity structure of debt using the largely cross-section data from Compustat.
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The papers first look for effects of the term structure on debt maturity. Here the estimated coefficient is either statistically insignificant or the wrong sign, given the tax hypothesis. Some of these papers 4 also looked for effects on a firm's behavior of its average corporate tax rate (taxes paid by a firm relative to its income or assets), and whether or not it has tax loss carryforwards. No tax effects were found. The trouble with these measures of the tax law is that they reflect largely the recent profitability of the firm, 5 which can have its own effects on corporate financial decisions. In addition, the term structure of interest can be correlated with business cycle factors, which again can have their own effects on firm behavior.
Our paper will carefully examine the effect of term structure and taxes on corporate use of debt and the debt maturity using the U.S. Statistics of Income Corporate Income Tax Returns.
The strength of this data set is that it includes summary data on all firms in the U.S. over a long period of time. Tax incentives vary sharply by size of firm, given the progressivity of the U.S.
Corporate Tax schedule. More importantly, relative tax rates for small vs. large firms have varied a lot over time. This variation allows us to identify the effects of corporate vs. personal tax rates on the debt maturity structure even while controlling flexibly for size-of-firm effects.
These tax effects were the focus in Gordon and Lee (2001) . Our current focus is on the effects of interest rates on financial policies.
As reported below, we do find statistical support for effects of nominal interest rates as well as taxes on corporate use of debt. In particular, we estimate that the variation in interest rates seem during our sample period lead to a 4.8 percentage point variation in the fraction of capital financed with debt, given average prevailing tax rates. In addition, we report evidence that the term structure of interest rates has small but statistically significant effects on the maturity structure of corporate debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly examine the hypotheses and develop the empirical strategy. The data are described in section 3, and regression results are reported in section 4. The paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion.
Theory and Specification
The theoretical forecasts for the effects of the tax structure on a corporation's choice on the extent to use long-term vs. short-term debt have been laid out in the past. 6 In order to motivate the particular empirical specification we use, however, it is helpful to summarize explicitly the nature of the theoretical argument. Owners of long-term debt also receive an ex-post capital-gain (loss if negative) of g in a given time period.
We examine first the incentives faced by the "marginal" shareholder whose preferences determine the pricing of corporate equity. Assume that this "marginal" shareholder has a personal tax rate of m, while the marginal tax rate on corporate income (including any subsequent personal taxes for this shareholder) is denoted byτ . By construction, this marginal investor is just indifferent between investing another dollar in the firm's equity or investing it instead in the bond market. Let the certainty-equivalent value for this investor of the random capital gain on long-term debt be denoted by ) (g c .
We assume that the firm's managers will borrow only so long as doing so raises the value per share of the equity in the firm. If the corporation borrows an additional dollar of short-term debt, the firm has an extra dollar to invest in real assets, but faces additional yearly expenses of
The marginal shareholder in equilibrium must value the return earned on an extra dollar's real investment at a dollar, so the certainty-equivalent return on a dollar of real investment for this investor must equal the return instead on a dollar invested in short-term bonds, which have an after tax yield of S r m) 1 ( − . Therefore, the net gain to this shareholder from extra corporate debt equals
. The investor gains from the firm's extra debt, and share prices then increase, to the extent that this expression is positive.
If instead the firm borrows an extra dollar of long-term debt, it again has an extra dollar to invest in real assets, but faces additional certainty-equivalent yearly expenses of
, where g t is the investor's capital gain's tax rate. The extra dollar of real investment has a certainty-equivalent return to the investor equal as well to that on long-term debt, so must equal the certainty-equivalent of ).
The net gain to the investor then equals
These tax incentives need to be traded off against any other pressures affecting the firm's desired use of debt. Assume that, ignoring these tax incentives, the firm would choose to use debt to finance δ % of its capital stock, 7 raising the fraction L δ of its capital using long-term debt, and
using short-term debt. Any deviations from these fractions are costly.
Assume that the costs, denoted C, have the functional form:
where K denotes the capital stock of the firm while d, d S and d L are parameters. The nontax marginal cost of additional short-term debt then equals
while the marginal cost of additional long-term debt equals
Equating these nontax costs with the above net tax gains from additional short-term or long-term debt and solving gives the following first-order conditions for
Together, these equations imply that the firm's overall debt/capital ratio should satisfy
Note that virtually all past empirical tests for tax effects on use of corporate debt looked for
, ignoring any interactions with interest rates.
In general the desired level of the debt/capital ratio and the desired maturity structure ignoring tax incentives, S δ and L δ , can vary by firm and over time. In particular, assume that
We will include in the vector X a flexible function of the amount of assets of the firm, a measure of the business cycle, this business-cycle measure interacted with the log(assets) of the firm in order to allow for a differing impact of the business cycle on small vs. large firms, and information on the asset composition of the firm's capital stock.
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In addition, we include throughout a dummy variable equal to 1 in all years following the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, individuals could no longer deduct nonmortgage interest payments and passive business losses (which commonly arose due to large interest deductions). For individuals for whom these restrictions are binding, the appropriate measure of their marginal tax rate under the personal tax is below their marginal tax rate on other sources of income. Corporate debt should then be more attractive than our figures suggest. We saw no way to capture these effects of the 1986 Tax Reform that go beyond changes in tax rates,
other than through such a dummy variable.
Description of Data Set
Data come from three sources: SOI Corporate Returns, SOI Individual Returns, and the Individual Model File (IMF). 10 All information about firms comes from the SOI Corporate Returns, which are available for 51 years from 1950 to 2000. These data report summary information taken from the corporate income tax returns each year, and cover all corporations in the US that file tax returns. While no information is ava ilable by firm, for confidentiality reasons, 9 The information available includes the fraction of the capital represented by depreciable assets, land, cash, and other assets. The expectation is that firms use more long-term debt to finance longer-lived assets. 10 The amount of debt held by firms in each asset category is divided into short-term and long-term debt. Short-term debt equals the accounting book value of "mortgages, notes, and bonds payable in less than one year," while long term debt matures in a year or more. Total debt is simply the sum of the two. The (accounting) book value of assets in each size category, as well as data on the asset composition of firms, are reported directly in the SOI Tables.
Personal income tax rates are calculated using the Individual Model File, when available, and otherwise with data from the SOI Individual Returns. The representative tax rate for income reported under the personal income tax is defined to equal the weighted average marginal tax rate, weighting by taxable income. One complication in capturing the effects of personal taxes on interest income is the role of pension funds and other institutional saving, which to a first approximation face a zero marginal tax rate on interest income. Assuming that pensio ns are as likely to rebalance their portfolios in response to a change in corporate financial policy as households are on the financial portfolios they control directly, we set t m equal to the weighted average tax rate calculated from personal tax returns multiplied by the fraction of household assets held outside of pensions and life insurance companies.
In principle, we also need to measure the effective personal tax rate on income from corporate equity. There is much debate in the tax literature on the appropriate measure of the effective tax rate on both dividends and capital gains. 13 Gordon and Lee (2001) found that the choice here had no substantive effects on their results, with a specification ignoring such taxes slightly outperforming one that used conventional measures to take them into account. For simplicity, we ignore personal taxes on income from corporate equity in this study.
In addition, we need some measure of business cycles in the time-series estimation. We measured business cycle effects by the ratio of the Dow Jones Index to GDP, on the grounds that behavior can change as soon as new information arrives about changing economic trends, and not just when these changes materialize. We allowed the response to business cycles to vary by size of firm by interacting this variable with st K ln .
Of course, we need a measure of short-term and long-term interest rates. Here, we used the 3-year Treasury Bond rate as a proxy for long-term interest rates and the 3-month Treasury
Bill rate for the short-term interest rate. 13 See, e.g. Auerbach (1979) , Bernheim (1991) and Constantinides (1983) for arguments that these effective tax rates can be zero or even negative. 14 We also tried using the AAA or the Baa corporate bond rates for the long-term rate, and the prime interest rate for the shortrate. Results were qualitatively unchanged. Since these rates have the disadvantage that they can be affected by the Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 . On average, long-term debt has been 64% of the total debt of US corporations, though this share varied greatly across size of firm and across years. The share of long-term debt in total debt tends to increase with firm size, as shown in Figure 1 , as would be expected based on the above theory, since large firms face higher corporate tax rates than do smaller firms. Nominal 3-year and 3-month TB interest rates varied greatly during the sample period, from a mere 1% to 14%.
Regression results
In estimating the parameters in equations 1.1 -1.3, we have available both time-series and crosssectional variation in the data. To learn anything from the cross-sectional variation, we need to control adequately for nontax factors that cause debt policies to vary by size of firm. By including a very flexible function of firm assets as a control, 15 identification is based on how the changes in debt policies over time compare with changes in tax incentives for firms of different sizes.
Our initial results explore the effects of interest rates on the overall debt/capital ratio.
Since past papers have ignored the effects of interest rates, we start in column (1) in Table 2 with a specification that also ignores interest rates:
. The reported estimate for the effects of taxes has the forecasted sign, but is small and statistically insignificant. 16 Consistent with past results, more debt is used to the extent that the firms' assets equilibrium amount of corporate debt due to changing default premiums, so are endogenous, we focused on the effects of government bond rates instead. 15 The functional form we chose was ∑ are longer term. 17 Firms also use more debt during recessions, particularly larger firms. As expected, firms use more debt after the 1986 Tax Reform, even after controlling for changes in tax rates.
According to the theory, however, these effects of taxes on use of debt should be larger the higher are nominal interest rates. To provide a nonparametric test for this, in column 2 we interact the tax variable with dummy variables indicating whether the short-term interest rate in that year is in the bottom, second, third, or top quartiles of its values during the full sample period. The forecast is that all of these coefficients should be positive, and that they should be larger during years when interest rates are larger. We find that the coefficients do increase monotonically with the size of interest rates. For all but the lowest quartile they are positive, and those for the highest two quartiles (but also the lowest quartile) are statistically significant.
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Column 3 then reports the results from estimating equation 1.3, interacting the tax variable with both the short-term interest rate and the difference between long-term and shortterm interest rates. Here, we find that only the short-term interest rate is strongly statistically significant. In contrast, the term structure matters little, at least for the overall level of debt.
Formally, we estimate that 0105
Column 4 reports estimates for equation 1.1, explaining K D L / . Here, we find highly statistically significant effects of the long-term interest rates, but no effects of the term structure.
In particular we now estimate that 0072 . = β , whereas we find that 0002 . = γ .
17 The omitted asset category is "other." 18 The years when interest rates are in the lowest quartile are the earliest years in the sample. While small firms commonly have more debt than larger firms, the negative coefficient on t st m − τ during this period suggests that the degree to which small firms had more debt was even greater during this earlier time period, perhaps because these firms faced greater difficulties in raising equity finance during these earlier years. We did not feel we had enough data to interact , which has the expected sign but is not statistically significant. We certainly cannot reject that the true γ is the same, based on the estimates in columns 4 and 5.
One concern with the above estimates, which rely heavily on the differences in corporate tax rates across size categories, is that these corporate tax rates equal the marginal tax rate at the average income of firms in a given size category rather than the theoretically appropriate but unavailable average of the marginal tax rates across firms in the size category. 19 The timeseries variation, in contrast, should be relatively free of this type of bias.
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We therefore estimated time-series specifications equivalent to those in Table 2 , but using as data in each year the weighted average across size categories of the data used in Table 2, weighting by the assets in each size category. Rather than trying to estimate again the effects of changes in the distribution of sizes, changes in average asset composition over time, and the implication of any changes in assets for business cycle effects, we subtract θX from the dependent variable, using the estimates from the corresponding column in Table 2 . 21 We did not subtract off the estimated effects of taxes, however, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the tax coefficients based on purely time-series variation. We also leave in the business cycle control variable, and the dummy variable for years after the 1986 Tax Reform. These variables vary only with time, so remain well identified even when we restrict the sample to aggregate time-series data.
Results are reported in Table 3 . In column 1, with K D / as the dependent variable, we now find that both tax variables have much larger coefficients than in now has the right sign, though again not statistically significant.
The standard errors in the two estimates for γ are sufficiently large that we cannot reject that the two values are the same.
These larger coefficients for the tax variables are consistent with a downward bias in the tax coefficients in Table 2 , due to differences between the average marginal tax rate and the marginal tax rate at average income. The differences are not that substantial, however, implying that both the cross-section and the time-series information provide qualitatively the same forecasts about the effects of interest rates on corporate financial policies.
Given the possible downward bias for the estimates in Table 2 , we focus on the estimates in Table 3 in making forecasts about the effects of interest rate changes and tax changes on debt policies. Using these estimates, we find that increasing interest rates by 13 percentage points, going from the minimum to the maximum during the sample period, assuming that 15
should increase the fraction of capital financed with debt by 4.8 percentage points (e.g., going L r by 200 basis points, for any given value of
percentage points using the results in columns 2-3 in Table 3 .
The estimated sensitivity to tax rates is comparable. When Table 3 . 23 The same tax change would raise
.2 percentage points using the estimates in Table 3 .
Summary and Discussions
Consistent with theoretical forecasts, we provide empirical evidence that corporate use of debt is affected by nominal interest rates, while the maturity structure of corporate debt responds to the term structure of interest rates. Inflationary increases in interest rates do have real effects due to this interaction with the tax law.
In particular, our estimates suggest that the variation in interest rates seem during our sample period are estimated to have lead to a 4.8 percentage point variation in the fraction of capital financed with debt, while a 200 basis point increase in the long-term interest rate for any given value of the short-rate is forecasted to lead to a 0.7 percent of capital being financed with long-term rather than short-term debt.
22 Note, though, that these results will vary across years and size categories, depending on the value of st st m − τ . 23 Note that these figures will differ across years, depending on the prevailing nominal interest rates. 1962 and 1966-9 . Dependent variables are the average values of the ratio of debt to assets each year, corrected for the effects of the non-tax variables or non-yearly variables using coefficients from column (3), (4), and (5) of Note: Log scale is used for the x-axis. The label is the year of the observation. Source: Authors' calculation using SOI Corporate Returns.
